When the Diaspora Becomes an Obstacle: The Armenian Diaspora and the Negotiations between Turkey and Armenia, 2009-2010

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The involvement of diasporas in state-of-origin peace processes is usually categorized as either "positive" or "negative." Some scholars, when explaining "negative" involvement, point to the identity-related issues that cause extreme and non-compromising views among diasporic members. This article claims that any major development in the homeland forces the diaspora to reflect on its identity, and that this reflection can cause resentment, and even lead to actions against such developments. This issue can be linked to the concept of "ontological security," that is, the idea that routine in relations with significant others contributes to a consistent sense of identity. The claim is supported by analyzing the case of the Armenian diaspora and the 2009-2010 negotiations between Armenia and Turkey.

Members of the Armenian diaspora are mainly descendants of survivors of the Armenian genocide of 1915, and as such feel they are the custodians of Armenian identity. The protocols signed by Turkey and Armenia on October 10, 2009, that were meant to establish diplomatic relations and open the shared border between the states, were received by most Armenian diasporic organizations with more resentment and protest than in Armenia itself. Two clauses in particular have raised an outcry. The first is the establishment of an intergovernmental subcommittee to examine the historical differences between

the countries. This conflicts with Armenia's longstanding insistence on referring to the events of 1915 as genocide. The second clause requires Armenia's recognition of the border between Armenia and Turkey, a demarcation that Armenia, since gaining independence, has refused to recognize officially. This article posits that achieving Turkish recognition of the genocide is a constitutive element of Armenian diasporic identity; thus, the diasporic organizations found it difficult to accept negotiations with Turkey without the precondition of such recognition. Acknowledging this identity-based issue can help to explain why major Armenian diasporic organizations were hostile to the negotiation process.

The negative response of large segments of the Armenian diaspora to the signing of the protocols between Turkey and Armenia highlights the need to address the issue of diaspora involvement in peace negotiations of the state of origin. The main claim in this article is that any major development in the homeland forces the diaspora to reflect on its identity, and that this reflection can lead to resentment in the diaspora, and even to measures to reverse these developments. In such cases, it is essential to consider the views of the diaspora; as Shain emphasizes, state-of-origin governments that are not attentive to the wishes of the diaspora are in danger of de-legitimization by segments of the diaspora. This can result in the failure to implement these actions, and even in the downfall of the leaders instigating them.[1] Interestingly, when diasporas perpetuate the conflict and act as peace-wreckers, they may antagonize not only those in the international community trying to mediate but also their kin in the state of origin.[2]

This article is divided into three sections. First, the evolving literature on diaspora and peacemaking in the state of origin is discussed. In the second section, identity-related issues and the concept of ontological security are examined and linked to the study of diaspora. An emphasis is placed on the influence of ontological security on the existence and prevalence within diasporic communities of extreme and non-compromising views of peace initiatives in the state of origin. The article addresses Steele's observation of the lack of sufficient research on the costs of ignoring threats to ontological security.[3] In the third section, theoretical claims are demonstrated through the case of Armenia and Turkey: more specifically, through an analysis of

the Armenian diaspora's reaction to the signing of protocols to establish diplomatic relations between Armenia and Turkey in October 2009.

The signing of these protocols was seen by the international community as a major breakthrough, following decades of strained Turkish-Armenian relations due to Turkish refusal to acknowledge the events of 1915 as genocide and over conflict with regard to Nagorno-Karabakh.[4] However, the process of ratification of the protocols has yet to materialize: Armenia's ruling coalition in parliament in April 2010 decided to freeze ratification of the protocols, a decision that can be linked to the opposition from some Armenian diasporic organizations, and in February 2015 President Serzh Sarkisian decided to recall the protocols from the Armenian parliament.

Diasporas and Peacemaking in the State of Origin

A growing literature addresses the role of the diaspora in the peace processes of its state of origin. Diaspora involvement in such peace processes depends not only on the diaspora's desire and intrinsic qualities, but also on opportunity.[5] In most host states in the West such opportunities seem to abound. In addition, not only are most conflicts open to outside influence, but in fact the opposing sides usually actively seek such intervention.

Most research tends to emphasize the negative impact diasporas can have. However, such valuation of "positive" or "negative" is in the eye of the beholder; for example, the preservation of the status quo may be beneficial to one side of the conflict only.[6] Some scholars address diaspora involvement in the prolongation of conflict, pointing to their ability to transfer weapons and funds to the fighting factions in the homeland. Others stress the role of the diaspora in the domestic politics in the state of origin. Drawing on Robert Putnam's concept of a two-level game, Shain, for example, writes of a three-level game, where leaders address the demands not only of their domestic constituencies and their adversary, but also of the diaspora.[7] This complication is exacerbated by the fact that diasporic members can be the most extreme and hard-lined of constituencies. Thus, members of the diaspora themselves may become spoilers in a peace process, or they may fund local spoilers.[8]

While the negative role of diasporas is frequently mentioned in scholarly work, it should be stressed that the opposite phenomenon exists as well.

As Shain notes, there is a range from staunch support of the peace process (in which diasporic organizations and their members even act as catalysts) to extreme hostility (in which diasporic organizations and their members might act to spoil the process).[9]

On the positive side of the continuum, diasporic communities can export liberal values and norms from their host state that contribute to peaceful resolution of conflicts and stability; they can help in reframing the conflict; they can participate in problem-solving workshops; and they can support moderates in the state of origin.[10] As Bercovitch states, "When it comes to reconciliation, people in the homeland are more accepting and willing to listen to advice from members of the diaspora rather than other foreigners."[11] Diasporas can also play a role in post-conflict reconstruction through funds and remittances, and may contribute to stabilizing and strengthening civil society. Moreover, host states that are interested in promoting peace processes related to conflict in the state of origin can encourage "positive" actions of the diaspora and penalize "negative" actions.[12]

Smith points out that diasporas may act as peacemakers at one stage and as peace-wreckers at a later stage, or vice versa.[13] In spite of the continuum between certain peace-supportive and peace-wrecking actions and motives, the two aspects can, and should, receive individual scholarly attention,[14] as some explanations are more useful in understanding one type of involvement than the other.

One prevalent explanation for diasporic members' tendency to hold extreme views is that the diaspora is not the one to face the consequences of non-compromising attitudes.[15] While this explanation carries some weight, a number of points discredit it: diaspora members are at times most willing to volunteer to fight; they usually have family connections to those involved in conflict; and the diaspora, through funding, does in fact absorb substantial material costs of the conflict in the homeland.[16] Another explanation is that extreme and nationalistic views prevail in diasporic groups that have not successfully integrated economically and socially into their host societies.[17] While such an explanation highlights the importance of developments in the host state as well as the state of origin, it cannot explain the prevalence of these views in an established and integrated diaspora. An additional explication for negative diasporic involvement is that members of the diaspora

send funds to the origin state without considering or taking responsibility for their final destination. This explanation has merit mostly with regard to the role of the diaspora in sustaining the fighting. It has less explanatory power in addressing the active role of diasporas in the domestic politics of the state of origin.

Lyons, among other scholars, has stressed the need to address the motives behind migration as a factor in diasporic attitudes toward the conflict at home. Thus, conflict-generated diasporas, or what is termed victim diaspora,[18] tend to be more extreme in their outlook than economically driven migrants. By highlighting identity-related aspects, this explanation complements the one suggested in this article. It should be stressed, though, that the distinction between voluntary/involuntary migration is not always clear: Van Hear notes that the economic hardships behind certain migrations are not always ones that could have been lived with, and hence the term voluntary is somewhat questionable.[19]

Although all the existing explanations of negative involvement of the diaspora have some power of explanation, they need to be further developed and better linked to existing concepts in international relations literature. In particular, issues related to identity dimensions are worthy of such expansion.

Ontological Security and Diasporas

Ontological security refers to the notion that routine in relations with significant others contributes to a consistent sense of identity.[20] As McSweeney states, ontological security concerns "the essential predictability of interaction through which we feel confident in knowing what is going on and that we have the practical skill to go on in this context."[21] Actors who are used to certain practices cannot easily discard them, since they may have become constitutive to their identities. While in its original conception ontological security referred to individuals, scholars have since applied the term to collective actors.

An interesting and important question pertains to the identity of the "other" with regard to the diasporic community.[22] It can be argued that in fact there are three significant others relating to a diaspora. The first are the other groups in the host state. Since one of the defining qualities of a diaspora is resistance to full integration with the host state, its differentiation

from other groups is significant. The second "others" are rival groups with which the diaspora (as part of the larger ethnic group) is in conflict. This enmity, which is constitutive to the identity of the ethnic group a whole, will most likely retain its identity-defining qualities in the diaspora. The third "others," although this may prove a contentious point, are the kin in the state of origin. While the diaspora and its originating kin group have much in common, there is a constant debate about the meaning and long-term legitimacy of the diasporic experience.

Although people in the state of origin as well as the diaspora may suffer from ontological insecurity, the assumption of this article is that the diaspora is more susceptible to such problems. The diaspora is more sensitive to fluctuations of ontological security, as their daily encounters with other groups in the host state make it much more aware of identity issues and their importance. Furthermore, the basic contradictions in the diasporic situation – such as the de-territorialized nationalism of such groups[23] – also highlight the significance of identity.

On a more concrete level, the discourse surrounding the issue of ontological security could be analyzed, identifying the utterances one could expect to see when a problem arises. Blunt statements admitting the difficulties of adapting to a changing reality are unlikely, since they mostly portray those voicing such views in a negative light.[24] Rather, one can expect statements that attempt to revalidate and re-affirm the threatened identity; statements that place the current threat in the context of recurring threats that have been successfully dealt with in the past; and statements and actions that rebuff the need for change and de-legitimize the agents of such change.

Ontological Security, Diasporas, and the Transition from Conflict to Peace in the State of Origin

In her 2006 groundbreaking article, Mitzen claims that one of the obstacles to advancing a peace process when trying to solve a protracted conflict is the emergence of an ontological security dilemma, suggesting that even destructive routines can provide continuity and thus ontological security. As a result, some states and societies are willing to sacrifice their physical security to ensure ontological security. What is somewhat puzzling, however, is that if issues of identity arising from the peace process are so influential,

one would not expect to see a great divergence of opinions between the homeland constituency and the members of the diaspora regarding this process. However, this is not always the case, and some diasporic communities hold more extreme views on average than the homeland population.

It has been shown that the diaspora tends to hold on to grievances caused by a conflict longer than the kin group in the state of origin.[25] As Bercovitch claims, "Diasporic communities tend to get involved in conflicts that touch on identity, beliefs, values, cultural norms or a way of life. Such conflicts are over issues that are quite intangible, and are often referred to as zero-sum conflicts. Intangible issues tend to make a conflict more violent, less amenable to compromise and resolution, and more prolonged and intractable."[26] Diasporas, especially those that were at one time "stateless diaspora,"[27] often feel they are the guardian of the group's identity and react harshly to any threat to this identity. Diasporic organizations see one of their main aims as passing on the memories of their traumatic experience and displacement to the next generations.[28]

Peace processes, along with other major developments in the state of origin, force the diaspora to reflect on its identity, and thus may undermine ontological security. Major events also tend to highlight the differences between the narratives of the homeland community and the diaspora, whereas normally the distance between the two communities allows each to maintain "its own spin on the national narrative and live out their shared identity in its own way."[29] Thus, this self-reflection and awareness can lead the diaspora to experience resentment – and even to taking measures to reverse such developments. This reaction is especially possible if the actions were taken without sufficient consultation with the diaspora.

The Armenian Diaspora and the Negotiations between Armenia and Turkey

The Armenian Diaspora: Background

There is no consensus on the number of Armenians in the world – estimates range from seven million to ten million. However, more than half of the world-wide population of Armenians is in the diaspora, including the former Soviet Union (excluding Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding areas).[30] The majority of the established Armenian diaspora members come from

the western regions of the Armenian homeland (those that were part of the Ottoman Empire). In spite of the wave of immigration at the end of the nineteenth century, most members of the established diaspora are descendants of the survivors of the Armenian genocide. The three main parties of the Armenian diaspora – rooted in the Armenian nationalist upsurge at the end of the nineteenth century – are the Dashnaks (ARF), the Hnchaks, and the Ramgavars. Traditionally, the ARF has held the most extreme and nationalistic views among the diasporic parties. The territory of the Republic of Armenia today lies in a relatively remote corner of the ancient Armenian homeland, and some diaspora members, especially those in the ARF, strive for the resurrection of "Greater Armenia."[31]

The largest diasporic communities in the West are in the US and France. In the former, Armenian-American diasporans mainly reside in California (specifically in Los Angeles) and in Massachusetts. Two notable achievements of the Armenian-American diaspora since Armenia regained independence in 1991 are the substantial American humanitarian aid to Armenia (one of the highest per capita allocation of American foreign assistance) and the successful campaign to persuade Congress in 1992 to ban US aid to Azerbaijan through Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act.[32]

The Signing of the 2009 Armenia-Turkey Protocols

The signing of the 2009 protocols was a culmination of a lengthy, mostly secretive, negotiation process between Turkey and Armenia with Swiss mediation. The negotiations led to what has been called "football diplomacy," after Turkish President Abdallah Gul was invited by Armenian President Sarkisian to attend the World Cup 2010 qualifying match in Yerevan between Armenian and Turkish national teams in September 2008. Saskisian later reciprocated with a visit to Istanbul in October 2009 to watch the rematch.

On August 31, 2009, it was reported in the media that Turkey and Armenia were embarking on six weeks of intensive negotiations prior to signing two protocols. One was on the establishment of diplomatic relations and the other on the development of bilateral relations. The signing ceremony on October 10, 2009 in Zurich went as planned; however, no statements of the signing parties were made during the ceremony because the Armenians objected to Turkish reference to the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh.[33] After the signing, the

hope was for a swift ratification process in both national parliaments and, later, the opening of the shared border between the states (which had been closed by Turkey in 1993, protesting Armenia's actions regarding the question of Nagorno-Karabakh). However, the ratification process has not advanced in either state, and, as already mentioned, Armenia has halted the process.

In an effort to raise support in the diasporic communities for the protocols with Turkey and to deal with opposition, Sarkisian embarked on an intensive tour of the major Armenian diasporic communities just before the signing. In early October 2009, he visited Paris, New York, Los Angeles, Beirut, and Rostov-on-Don in Southern Russia.[34] Sarkisian was greeted with much protest in the diasporic communities, and his tour failed to garner the support he had hoped for the signing of the protocols.

Some may question treating the diaspora as a unitary actor,[35] pointing out that several diasporic organizations did in fact show support for the signing of the protocols. However, the diaspora on the whole showed a stronger than expected opposition to the protocols, while people in Armenia showed milder than expected resistance.[36] Even those organizations that did support the signing of the protocols did not see this as compromising the basic demand that Turkey recognize the Armenian genocide, and in fact some claimed that the protocols would advance such recognition.[37] Hence, the following is a discussion of the prevailing voice among diasporic organizations; analysis of diverging views is left for later works.

The Sources of Armenian Diaspora Objections to the Protocols

As outlined in the theoretical section, three forms of utterances can indicate that a problem of ontological security has arisen: statements that concern revalidation and re-affirmation of the threatened identity; statements that place the current threat in the context of recurring threats and how they have been dealt with in the past; and statements that rebuff the need for change and that de-legitimize the agents of change.

Revalidation and re-affirmation of the threatened identity. The collective traumatic memory of the Armenian genocide has been the most significant factor in shaping the diasporic identity, in the cohesion of the diaspora, and in the elites' ability to mobilize support.[38] The struggle to achieve Turkish recognition of the genocide has become a constitutive element of Armenian

diasporic identity. It has also been one of the main issues around which the diasporic organizations easily unite.[39] Hence, the Armenian diaspora finds it hard to accept an agreement between Turkey and Armenia without the precondition that the Turks acknowledge the events of 1915 as genocide. As Richard Giragosian, director of the Yerevan-based Armenian Center for National and International Studies claims, "The diaspora has a one-issue identity; it's the genocide and nothing more. They see this whole rapprochement with Turkey as a threat to their very identity. They don't see it in the same context that the Armenian government sees it, in terms of a need to open the border and a need for normal relations…The only benefits that could come will be accrued by the Armenian government and the Armenian population. *The diaspora sees nothing but harm and nothing but a threat*."[40]

The diaspora also raised an outcry over the clause in the protocols concerning the establishment of an intergovernmental subcommittee on the "historical dimension," a clause that clashed with Armenia's longstanding insistent opposition to such deliberations.[41] The Armenians claimed that most Western historians agree that the events of 1915 constitute genocide, and they maintain that any debate over this issue would only contribute to continued Turkish denial.

Related to the question of acknowledging the genocide is the question of reprisal. Over the years, the Turks have feared that their recognition of the genocide would generate Armenian territorial demands in eastern Turkey. Turkey's suspicions were fueled by the fact that Armenia, since gaining independence in 1991, has refused to officially recognize the border between the two states. Part of the protocol process was Armenia's recognition of the demarcation. This clause was also received with anger in the diaspora, since, as mentioned above, most members of the diaspora are descendants of genocide survivors who had originally lived in the eastern parts of today's Turkey. Armenian Youth Federation (AYF) chairman Arek Santikian, in a protest rally on Sarkisian's visit to Los Angeles, stated, "He's here trying to convince the diaspora that these protocols are good for Armenia, whereas our stance is that we want peace and normalization with Turkey, but *we don't want it at the cost of selling our historical rights and rights to our land*, and that's what these protocols are doing."[42] The slogan "We remember, We demand, We refuse" – which protesters in Beirut wrote on placards in

a demonstration during Sarkisian visit to Lebanon[43] – sums up the lasting effect of the constitutive element of the memory of the genocide and the struggle for recognition in Armenian diasporic identity.

Placing the current threat in the context of recurring threats. As the Armenians are one of the ancient peoples of the world, it is not difficult for diasporic Armenians to place current threats in the context of recurring threats. However, the diaspora also placed the current threat in the context of threats that it *as a diaspora* has dealt with in the past. For example, Kenneth Hachikian, the chairman of the Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA), in an event marking the 119th anniversary of the foundation of the ARF, placed the current threat from the Armenian-Turkish protocols in the context of past challenges that have been successfully dealt with: "In our unity we will find strength…Just as we have, for so many years, seen the value of unity in our work in defense of Armenia's rights and Nagorno-Karabakh's freedom…We have seen this time and again, our community united behind a common purpose, yet still subject to foreign attacks, typically through proxies, aimed at undermining our unity and playing divide and conquer games at our expense. We saw this in: our defense of Section 907, our attack on the Turkish Armenian Reconciliation Commission, our opposition to the Hoagland nomination,[44] and, once again, today on the Protocols and the Madrid Principles."[45]

Some voices placed the current threat in a more pessimistic light, according to which the Armenians have repeatedly been on the losing side. Georgette Avagian, a member of an organization related to the ARF, spoke about the signing of the protocols between Armenia and Turkey: "Now April 24 and October 10 become days of mourning for us because today we have lost our historical lands, and the issue of the recognition of the Armenian Genocide has turned to dust."[46] In a similar vein, ANCA stated, "The success of Turkey in pressuring Armenia into accepting these humiliating one-sided protocols proves, sadly, that genocide pays."[47]

Rebuffing the need for change and de-legitimizing agents of change. Armenians advocating the importance of the protocols for Armenia and of opening the shared border with Turkey stressed that the blockade by Azerbaijan and Turkey has had devastating effects on the Armenian economy and has caused a massive exodus of Armenians from Armenia. However,

diasporans remained suspicious of explanations touting the economic benefits for Armenia of signing the protocols, claiming that only very few Armenians – mostly businessmen – would in fact benefit (these "businessmen" were, moreover, linked to corruption in Armenia).[48]

President Sarkisian was also personally attacked in an attempt to de-legitimize his actions. Hachikian, chairman of ANCA, claimed that his actions were "naive" "reckless," and "simply irresponsible."[49] In this respect, it was claimed that the Turks cheated Sarkisian into providing an excuse for U.S. President Barack Obama to renege on his presidential election campaign pledge to call the 1915 massacres genocide.[50] The U.S. was also accused of pressuring Armenia to sign the protocols against its interest. ANCA, just before the signing of the protocols, stated, "The U.S. arm-twisting of the government in Yerevan to accept an agreement that would call this very crime against humanity into question both squanders America's moral capital in the cause of genocide prevention and sets back the cause of genuine Armenian-Turkish dialogue by many years."[51]

In its commentary on the protocols, ANCA stressed that "the Armenian Diaspora is a core stakeholder in the rights, interests, and future of the Armenian nation. The Armenian Government represents the 3 million citizens of Armenia, but cannot rightfully or legitimately speak in the name of the more than 8 million Armenians living around the world."[52] Harut Sassounian, publisher of the *California Courier*, the oldest independent English-language Armenian newspaper in the U.S., also criticized the absence of diasporic representatives in the negotiations: "The Armenian government made no attempt during the lengthy negotiations with Turkey to consult with Diaspora Armenians, despite the fact that the Protocols addressed vital pan-Armenian issues. Months ago, when organizations and individuals expressed serious concerns regarding the preliminary text of the Protocols, they were simply ignored by the Armenian authorities. Attempts to hold discussions at the eleventh hour are futile, since the Armenian Foreign Minister has declared that the Protocols cannot be amended."[53] Thus, part of the resentment in the diaspora arose because the Armenian state's actions – which would have serious repercussions on the Armenian diaspora – were taken without sufficient consultation with the diaspora. This lack of dialogue exacerbated the ontological security concerns.

Conclusions

This article asks why the diaspora in general takes a more extreme and non-compromising stance than the state of origin when it comes to settling prolonged conflicts of the origin state, and demonstrates that part of the answer lies in perceived threats to the ontological security of diasporas. In the Armenian case, the article asserts that the objections of the diaspora to the signing of the protocols without Turkish recognition of the genocide can be explained by the constitutive element in the diasporic identity of achieving such acknowledgement.

The logical question that follows is what can be done to encourage more positive involvement of the diaspora? One possibility is to actively inform diaspora leaders in real time about major policy shifts of the state of origin in order to make the transition from conflict to peace more gradual. Moreover, it might be important to involve, if possible, diasporic leaders themselves in the peace negotiations.[54] Østergaard-Nielsen suggests that dialogue should be conducted not only with the diaspora but between opposing factions within the diaspora.[55] This can be done also in Track II initiatives, although until now Armenia-based civil society organizations showed reluctance to involve diaspora members in normalization projects, because they thought their presence might block any advances. Another obstacle has been the fear of diaspora members that they might be used for public relations purposes by the Turkish government, and this fear should be alleviated in order to proceed.[56] While it may seem at first that these new venues would only further complicate matters, they may contribute in the long run to more stable peace. Helping the diaspora to create a "new identity" and new roles in the post-conflict period would also ease the tensions related to the fear that the "old identity" will no longer be relevant. The diaspora is also potentially an actor that has a long-term approach that many times is needed for post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation.[57]

Notes

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1 Yossi Shain, *Kinship and Diasporas in International Affairs* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2007), p. 101.

2 Hazel Smith, "Diasporas in International Conflict," in *Diasporas in Conflict: Peace-Makers or Peace-Wreckers*, eds. H. Smith and P. Stares (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2007), p. 15.
3 Brent J. Steele, *Ontological Security in International Relations: Self-Identity and the IR State* (London: Routledge, 2008), p. 3.
4 Nagorno-Karabakh is a source of tension in the bilateral relations between Turkey and Armenia since the Turks support Azerbaijan's positions regarding the conflict and because Armenians view Azerbaijanis as "Turk."
5 Khatharya Um, "Political Remittance: Cambodian Diasporas in Conflict and Post Conflict," in *Diasporas in Conflict: Peace-Makers or Peace-Wreckers,* p. 255.
6 Camila Orjuela, "War, Peace and the Sri Lankan Diaspora: Complications and Implications for Policy," in *Diasporas, Armed Conflicts and Peacebuilding in their Homelands*, ed. A. Swain, Uppsala Report No. 79, 2007, pp. 62-63.
7 Shain, *Kinship and Diasporas in International Affairs,* pp. 101-2.
8 Yossi Shain and Ravinatha P. Aryasinha, "Spoilers or Catalysts? The Role of Diasporas in Peace Processes," in *Challenges to Peacebuilding: Managing Spoilers during Conflict Resolution*, eds. E. Newman and O. Richmond (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2006).
9 Shain, *Kinship and Diasporas in International Affairs*, p. 114.
10 Gabriel Sheffer, *Diaspora Politics: At Home Abroad* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 216; Jacob Bercovitch, "A Neglected Relationship: Diasporas and Conflict Resolution," in *Diaspora in Conflict: Peace-Makers or Peace-Wreckers*, pp. 26, 30, 33-34.
11 Bercovitch, "A Neglected Relationship: Diasporas and Conflict Resolution," p. 35.
12 Smith, "Diasporas in International Conflict," p. 13.
13 Ibid., p. 10.
14 There is in fact currently a bias toward studying the "peace-wreckers" rather than the "peace-makers" phenomenon. See Jonathan Hall, Roland Kostic, and Ashok Swain, "Diasporas and Peace Building: A Multifaceted Association," in *Diasporas, Armed Conflicts and Peacebuilding in their Homelands*, p. 10.
15 Stephen M. Saideman and Erin K. Jenne, "The International Relations of Ethnic Conflict," in *Handbook of War Studies III: The Intrastate Dimension,* ed. M. I. Midlarsky (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2009), p. 266.
16 Jolle Demmers, "Diaspora and Conflict: Locality, Long Distance Nationalism, and Delocalisation of Conflict Dynamics," *The Public* 9, no. 1 (2002): 95.
17 Hall, Kostic, and Swain, "Diasporas and Peace Building," p. 14.
18 Robin Cohen, *Global Diasporas: An Introduction* (London: UCL Press, 1997).
19 Nicholas Van Hear, *New Diasporas: The Mass Exodus, Dispersal and Regrouping of Migrant Communities* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1998), p. 42.

20 Jennifer Mitzen, "Ontological Security and World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma," *European Journal of International Relations* 12, no. 3 (2006): 342. See also Ayse Zarakol, "Ontological (In)Security and State Denial of Historical Crimes: Turkey and Japan," *International Relations* 24, no. 1 (2010): 3.

21 Bill McSweeney, *Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 155.

22 In this respect, see Jolanta A. Drzewiecka, "Reinventing and Contesting Identities in Constitutive Discourses: Between Diaspora and Its Others," *Communication Quarterly* 50, no. 1 (2002): 2-3.

23 Fiona B. Adamson and Madeleine Demetriou, "Remapping the Boundaries of 'State' and 'National Identity': Incorporating Diasporas into IR Theorizing," *European Journal of International Relations* 13, no. 4 (2007): 492.

24 An exception might be a more legitimate nostalgic yearning, but this is more likely to occur in much later stages.

25 Paul Collier, V. L. Elliot, Havard Hegre, Anke Hoeffler, Marta Reynal-Querol, and Nicholas Sambanis, *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy* (Washington: World Bank and Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 86; Shain, *Kinship and Diasporas in International Affairs,* p. 115; Terrence Lyons, "Diaspora and Homeland Conflict," in *Territoriality and Conflict in an Era of Globalization*, eds. M. Kahler and B. F. Walter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 111.

26 Bercovitch, "A Neglected Relationship: Diasporas and Conflict Resolution," p. 24.

27 On the importance of the differentiation between state-linked diasporas (such as the Koreans and the Cubans) and stateless diasporas (such as the Kurds and the Palestinians) see also Cohen, *Global Diasporas*, p. 193.

28 Lyons, "Diaspora and Homeland Conflict," p. 114.

29 Shain, *Kinship and Diasporas in International Affairs*, pp. 103-4.

30 The low estimate of the number of Armenians appears in Susan P. Pattie, "Longing and Belonging: Issues of Homeland in the Armenian Diaspora," *Working Paper, Transnational Communities Programme-99-11* 1999, www.transcomm.ox.ac.uk/working%20papers/pattie.pdf, p. 4. A high estimate can be found in "Armenian Population of the World," http://www.armeniadiaspora.com/population.html.

31 Pattie, "Longing and Belonging," pp. 3-4.

32 The U.S. Freedom Support Act passed by the Congress in 1992 aimed to facilitate economic and humanitarian aid to the former republics of the Soviet Union. Due to pressures from Armenian lobby groups, in section 907 of the act, Azerbaijan was excluded from direct assistance until it lifted the blockade on Armenia, which was set up in response to the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh.

33 "Turkey's Proposal Clears Last-Minute Snag in Zurich," *Today's Zaman*, October 12, 2009.

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